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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL 
vs. 
OIL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL ) 
COMMISSION OF UTAH AND FRED L. FORSYTH,) 
Defendants. 
Case No.14699 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a petition by the employer, Continental Oil 
Company, hereinafter called Continental, to review the decision 
of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Department of Employment Security, which decision reversed the 
Appeals Referee, who had found that an employee, Fred L. Forsyth, 
hereinafter called Forsyth, was discharged for misconduct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board 
of Review and reinstatement of the decision of the Appeals Referee 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Forsyth was employed by Continental as a district sales 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
representative. As such, Forsyth was furnished a company car, 
inasmuch as his duties involved daily traveling (R18). Continental 
has, and then had, safety as one of its priority goals (R22). 
After work, on February 4, 1976, Forsyth went to a 
local bar and had four or five drinks, prior to going to a 
party. On his way to the party he rear ended another car, 
damaging both vehicles and injuring the woman driver of the 
other car (R17). 
At the time of this accident he was driving under a 
restricted drivers license because of a prior conviction for 
driving under the influence of alcohol, on February 3, 1975. 
The prior conviction had resulted from Forsyth's ramming into 
an abuttment after entering 1-15 from the fifth south on-ramp. 
Forsyth here testified before the Appeals Referee, MI was under 
the influence at the timen. Forsyth had concealed this accident 
and conviction and the restriction of his driver's license from 
Continental (R15-16,45). v.-i -, > 
In August of 1974, Forsyth had been involved in an 
accident wherein he had backed into an approaching vehicle (R15). 
In addition to these three accidents Forsyth, in 1973 and 1974, 
had been arrested for speeding and for failure to obey a traffic 
control signal (R45). All of these driving problems occurred in 
less than 2 1/2 years. 
Upon being informed of the above, Continental's manager 
of marketing consulted with the general manager of marketing. 
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Despite the fact that Continental had planned to offer Forsyth 
a new position with the company (R38), it was determined that 
his employment be terminated. The decision was made solely 
because of Forsyth's driving record (R21-23). 
Forsyth applied for unemployment compensation. 
Compensation was awarded by the Utah Department of Employment 
Security representative, less six week's compensation because 
Forsyth had been terminated for misconduct. This deduction was 
based upon 35-4-5 (b) (1) , which provides as follows: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits — : 
(b) (1) For the week in which he has been 
discharged for misconduct not constituting 
a crime connected with his work, if so found 
by the commission, and for not less than one 
or more than the nine next following weeks, 
as determined by the commission in each case 
according to seriousness of the misconduct". 
Forsyth appealed this ruling to the Appeals Referee 
and, after an evidentiary hearing, the Appeals Referee affirmed 
the prior ruling, on the basis that Forsyth had been discharged 
for misconduct in connection with his work (R9-12). 
Forsyth then, ex-parte and without knowledge of 
Continental, wrote the Industrial Commission, stating that he 
had been acquitted of the last drunken driving charge and 
submitting other reasons why the decision should not stand (R8). 
The Board of Review, again without notice to Continental 
and without any hearing, reversed the decision of the Appeals 
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Referee and awarded unemployment benefits, stating MThe 
company could very well have had good cause in terminating the 
claimant; however, the evidence fails to support a finding that 
his discharge was for misconduct11 (R6) . 
Continental appeals this last ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Forsyth's driving constituted misconduct. 
Misconduct includes a disregard of standards of behavior 
which the employer has a right to expect of his employee. One 
purpose of the statutory reduction of unemployment benefits in 
the case of an employees misconduct is: 
"To deny the benevolent benefits of the statute 
to those who bring about their own unemployment 
by conducting themselves, as respects their 
employment, with such callousness, deliberate or 
wanton misbehavior, or lack of consideration 
that, to the minds of reasonable men, would 
justify the employer in discharging the 
employee. Another purpose of such a provision 
is to prevent the dissipation of unemployment 
reserve funds due to disqualifying acts rather 
than lack of suitable job opportunity". 
(76 Am Jur 2d Unemployment Compensation, par. 52) 
A recent annotation, 26 ALR 3d 1356, 1361-1362, 
Unemployment Compensation-Misconduct cites various cases 
wherein "employees discharged from employment for involvement 
in automobile accidents have been deemed guilty of 'misconductf 
so as to bar the discharged employee-driver from unemployment 
compensation benefits". 
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In Department of Industrial Relations v. Rich 
(1963) 42 Ala App 80, 152 So 2d 692, where an elderly truckdriver 
who had been employed as such for 16 years was discharged after 
the ice cream truck he was driving was involved in a one-car 
accident, the court affirmed a denial of unemployment compen-
sation predicated on lfmisconductn, where the evidence given by 
the patrolman and the employer, both of whom were on the scene 
shortly after the accident, was to the effect that the claimant 
had been drinking while driving. 
The Appeals Referee, in describing Forsyth's conduct, 
"In the course of performing the duties of his 
job, the claimant was given the responsibility 
of operating a company vehicle. As his employer's 
representative, this entails the assumption on 
their part of liability for the acts of the 
claimant. Conduct contrary to the best interests 
of the employer in the operation of this vehicle 
demonstrates an indifference or disregard of 
j.'• = :' the employee's duty to his employer which constitutes 
a breach of his duties and obligations arising 
out of the contract of employment, and comprises 
misconduct in connection with his work" (Rll). 
II. The misconduct was connected with his work. 
Forsyth drove a company owned car. He used it daily 
in his work. Continental was directly affected by the poor 
driving because of the respondeat superior liability involved, 
as well as the company's awareness of the dangers involved to 
all concerned (R22). 
III. The evidence supports the finding that the 
discharge was for misconduct. 
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The only evidence of the reason for discharge was 
the testimony of Robert Adams, the divisional manager of 
marketing for the division in which Forsyth was working. Adams 
testified that, except for Forsyth's driving record, Forsyth 
was a good employee. The only reason for his termination was 
his driving record (R21-22). There is no evidence to the contrary. 
IV. Rules of review require reversal. 
35-4-10(i) UCA 1953 provides the findings of fact shall 
be conclusive if supported by the evidence. Also, the well 
established rule of review is that the evidence is to be looked at 
in the light most favorable to the findings. This is so because 
the trier of fact is better able than the reviewing authority to 
evaluate testimony and to weigh the evidence. The usual 
situtation in which this rule is applied is one involving 
findings of fact of a district court as the trier of fact. Here 
there is a two step, instead of a one step, appellate procedure. 
Instead of an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, there is an 
intermediate appeal to the Review Board of the Industrial 
Commission and then a review of the proceedings by the Supreme 
r\ r 
Court as provided by 35-4-10 UCA 1953, as amended. The Appeals 
Referee conducted the hearing, heard the witnesses and made findings. 
The lay Board of Review had no opportunity to observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses. It took no evidence. It is no 
better able to weigh the evidence than is this court. The rationale 
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of the rule of review is that the trier of fact (here the Appeals 
Referee), not the intermediate appellate tribunal, should be 
affirmed if there is competent evidence to sustain his findings 
of fact. The Board of Review made no findings of fact but merely 
held that the evidence did not support the Appeals Referee's 
finding of fact that the discharge was for misconduct (R6). 
"The commission may not, without any reason or cause, 
arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to believe and act upon 
credible evidence which is unquestioned and undisputed". 
Peterson v. Industrial Commission, 102 U 175, 129 P 2d 563, 
564, quoting Mr. Justice Frick. As stated above the Board of 
Review was capricious and arbitrary in ignoring the findings of 
the Appeals Referee, in that the unrebutted testimony of Adams 
was that Forsyth was fired because of his poor driving record. 
In Members of Iron Workers Union vs. Industrial 
Commission,104 U 242, 139 P2d 208, 211, this court in reviewing 
an order of the Industrial Commission based upon the decision 
of the Appeals Referee denying unemployment compensation, stated: 
"We come then to the determination of the 
question as to whether there is in the record 
any competent and substantial evidence to 
support the findings, conclusions and decision 
of the appeal referee who acted as the appeal 
tribunal. 
The appeal referee had to choose between the 
testimony of witnesses for the S.W.O.C. and the 
testimony of company witnesses. — 
There was material, substantial and competent 
evidence introduced to justify the findings 
and conclusions. The S.W.O.C. applicants 
therefore cannot prevail." 
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In Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees vs. 
Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission, 
13 U2d 262, 372 P2d 987-989, the court, in considering the 
findings of the Appeals Referee stated: , , 
r
 "We are obliged to analyze this 
determination in accordance with the 
established rules of review: that the 
evidence is to be looked at in the light 
most favorable to the findings; and in 
so doing, if there is evidence of any 
substance whatever which can reasonably 
be regarded as supporting the determination 
made, it must be affirmed". 
The only findings in the instant case are those of the 
Appeals Referee. They are supported by the evidence that Forsyth 
was terminated because of his poor driving record. 
V. Evidence outside the record. 
Forsyth's letter to the commission, written after the 
hearing, (R7), stating that he had been acquitted of his last 
charge, was referred to in the Board of Review's reversal of 
the Appeals Referee. Whether or not in fact he was tried and 
acquitted is not a part of the record. 
35-4-10(d)(2) UCA 1953, provides that "the Board 
of Review may on the basis of the evidence previously submitted 
in such case, or upon the basis of such additional evidence as 
it may direct be taken, affirm, modify or reverse the findings, 
conclusions and decision of the Appeal Referee". (emphasis added) 
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The Board of Review stated "in reversing the disqualification, 
the Board has taken into consideration— the acquittal of the 
driving charges of February 4, 1976, which acquittal came 
subsequent to the hearing" (R6). The reversal by the Board of 
Review was thus based in part upon evidence outside of the 
record, in violation of the above statute. 
Furthermore, if it be assumed that there was in fact 
a criminal trial and acquittal, such acquittal may well have 
been based upon lack of evidence, inasmuch as Forsyth had 
refused to submit to an alcohol test (R17). Also, an acquittal 
may occur because of ineffectiveness of the prosecution or 
effectiveness of the defense, particularly when guilt must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Forsyth, himself, in this Unemployment Compensation 
hearing testified he had had four or five drinks after work and 
that while going to a party, driving on a license suspended 
because of prior drunken driving, he rear ended another car 
(R17). His discharge was not dependent upon a conviction or 
acquittal of criminal charges. Nor would any acquittal erase 
his prior arrest and accident record. 
Conviction or acquittal of the last drunken driving 
charge should have no effect on this proceeding because 
35-4-5(b)(l) UCA 1953, expressly refers to a discharge "for 
conduct not constituting a crime" connected with his work. 
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The criminality of his conduct is not now involved nor was it 
the basis of his discharge. The reason for termination was his 
poor driving record. -
 v 
*f CONCLUSION • 
Forsyth1s job involved driving. His driving record 
was poor. He was discharged for misconduct connected with his 
work and for no other reason. The evidence supports the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and decision of the Appeals Referee 
and does not support the decision of the Board of Review. The 
latter decision should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
<""•_---^ *^ v 2 J / <2r~<^*—*- ^  
John W. Lowe of 
Brayton, Lowe § Hurley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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